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0INTRODUCTORY

OL/

great wisdom and policy of the sges and found-

"The

ers of our law have provided4 that no possibility,
action,

nor thing in

title

ing contentions

of the

shall be granted or assigned

for that would be the occasion of multiply-

to strangers,

suits,

arxi

of great oppression of the

and chiefly of terre-tenants,

people,

due

right,

and the subversion

and equal execution of justice."

These are

thL

ion delivered in

words

of Lord Coke in

Lampet's Oase

(10 Co.

tain the reasons of one of the greatest
for the existence

of the rule

at

his great opin-

47 a).

They con-

of Englisbi judges

common law which prohib-

ited the

assignment of any possibility,

thing in

action.

right,

This rule was absolute.

title

or

No matter

how valuable the possibility or interest might be;

no

matter how certain and definite the event upon the happening or non-happening of which such possibility would
becorc& Ir esent and vested;
ceeding or how strictly

the

no i atter how formal the proinstrument

of intended trans-

2

if

fer was phrased;

tential existence at

or po-

the subject was not in actal

the time of the grant or assignment,

he who attempted

to enforce his claim found himself per-

fectly powerless

in

There

a court of law.

seems to be some

chance for dmfference

pinion respecting the reasonfdng for the strict
to this rule.

of o-

adherence

The origin of this rIle was attributed

by Coke to the "wisdom and policy of the sages and founders of our law",

to discourage maintenare

and litiga-

tion.

This seems

ible.

Uhdoubtedly an unrestricted power of assigning

future

broadly reasonable

interests amd expectancies,

and extremely plaus

might

give rise to

niay secret as well as annoying transactions which would
be entered into for the

satisfactions of private

animos-

ities or for the satisfaction of some unprincipled desire
for gain.

Such a power might,

indeed,

of the multiplying of contentions
pression of the

people,

be the "occasion

and suits,

of great op-

and chiefly of terre-tenants

and

the subversion of the due and equal execution of justice'"
As a result,

a just and discriminating public policy

would demand that this power
least,

would be withheld,

curtailed to an extent that would deprive

or at
the ex-

3

ercise of that power of its

It

ievil consequences.

is

thus readily observed that Lord Coke bases the reasons
Lampet's Case squarely on the broad

for his opinion in
principles

of public policy anduniversal justice as those
sages and

principles were discovered and applied by the
founders
It

of English law.

ty for difference

opportuni-

is

has already been stated that there

of opinion in regard to the scientific

basis of this common law rule against the unrestricted a
assignment

of choses

tion and development

in action.

Happily for the evolu-

of Anglo Saxon law and jurisprudence

no opportunity for difference of opinion,
and widening fields

the wide

in

hD s been left un-

of -h w and equity,

seized by the judicial m d controversial minds of England and Anerica.

Consequently criticisms

of the reason

given by Lord Coke for the existence of

this rigid com-

It

ifas been argued

and lengthy.

mon law rule are

with much plausibility that

log.ical

this rule was the

as being

outcome of the primitive notion of a contract
purely Personal and originating no liability
the larties

immediately included

Prin. of Con.,

p. 202)

.

in

its

o~tside of
terms.

(Pollock'

The primitive notion of a con-

tract!

WTence comes this "primitive view of a crntract"?

Was the

contract created firsand then folloied by the

creation of man whose legal nature was so cnnstructed as
to blend harmoniously with the nature of the crntract?
Did the contract spring full grown from the brow of justice, or was the essential nature of the contract arn

ev-

lution from the slow centuries of social existence? Which
is first the m.an or the contract?
neuessity pr-ecedes principle.

It would seem that

The natureof man and the

necessities of the socilal structure areLhe

prime forces

which in the play and inter play of their resle .ctive tend-encies evolve a public, social policy of utilitarian
justice.

Public policy 6s an evolution.

It

is

the

i

trusty pilot that guides the mind of the judge through
the intricacies
and practice,

of present necessity and past principle

so that,

while he g]ides clear of abso-

lute individualism on the one h nd, he also avoids on the
other, the equally dangerous tendency of absorption of t
the individual in the state.
same

That is, expressing the

idea in another way, public policy rrotects each pa

ticular individual,

but never a particular indiividual

at the expense of society as a whole.

Nothing lives

5

iNothing long continues

that goes against public mforals.

survives that contervenes

These are all

public justice.

is evident, thee

It

but parts of a great public policy.
fore,

iNothing

iI-ilitates against sound public law.

th t

every

every custom,

that every jirnciple,

law,

which serves to knit society morn closely together and
which tends to produce
number,

is

the greatest good to the greatest

It never had nor has

one of the many progeny.
any of the

A contract is

but a child of public policy.

inherent qualities nor virtues

has always looked and

of its

policy forits interpretrtion, force and effect.
public policy once demanrd it

It

own.

to public

continues to look,

still

now,

it

and the entire nature

Let
of the

contract would be changed as soon as a test case could
receive fina-l adjudication in
In

view of all

this it

is

the courts of justice.

sacevhat difficult for the

dinary individual to perceive

just how M.r.

Pollock is

orto

be justified in his criticism of Lord Cokse regarding the
foundation of the
of choses

common law rule against

in action.

At best,

tion from the great principle
This

it

is

assignment

but calling atten-

to one of its

may be clarifying and useful,

the

but

it

apiplications.
should hardly

6

be made the occasion of an attack on merit.

the existence crf the rule to broad public

attributes
policy; Mr.

Pollock,

ship fo'nder in

to (ine phase of public policy.

waves.

JIr-

Pollock contends

Observe

A

mid-ocean during a heavy sea; Lord Coke

holds that the destruztion of the vessel is
the sea;

Lord Coke

that

the difference.

it

is

caused by

caused by the

C HAFPTRR

TI.

0ASSIGNMENTS OF CHOSES IN ACTION AT THE
CO MMOIN LAW

The
es,

subjects of property are

divided

things in possession and things not in

Things not in

possession may be subdivided

things of which tlere is

possession.
into those

the right of present

and those concerning which there
ture possession.

into two class-

is

possession

a mere right of fu-

Now the common law had no means or

methods of dealing completely with the second of these
classes.

That is

to say,

the only ownership which the

common law completely recognized was the ownership accompanied by possession.
But where the ownership and the
possession were severed the only right which the common
law recognized was

the right to recover possession.

In

other words the right of the real owner was simply a law
suit-- a chose in action.
It

has already been shown in a way how seriously the

commnon law objected

to the transfer of choses

in

act ion.

Where there was a present right to the future acquisi-

more at fault,

the commn law was st ill

tion of property,

the goods but

for there was not even a right to recover
only a right

to t!ecover

motive already

ingt" says Lord Coke,

"Nothing

entry,

action,
so,

under color

might be granted to great men,

pretended titles
right might

in

for

can be granted over;

entrr,

might be assigned.

etc.

of action,

rights

titles,

The modern writer

even very anxious

to p.oint

out,

is

partial

and corrupt must have been the

justice

where such reasons could exercise

mind oT the student who
scientific
just

comprehension

the iYnner

in

"Noth-

or rethereof,
whereby

willing to admi

is

indeed,

le desires

justice

oppressed".

be trodden down and t he weak

(Co. Lit. 114 a).

ive force.

that

possibilities,

and oppression would follow if

fail

would

an apprehension

mentioned-

the

in

we find it

rule

seek the reason for this

When we

non-delivery.

their

darcrages for

how feeble,

administration of
such a decis-

to impress (inefaceably)upon the
is

anxious

to obtain a broad and

of the gradual

which early justice

together with such a perfect

evolution

of law,

was administered,

idea of the problems

and

conditions with which jurists were compelled to grapple
as' will soften a too severe condenation of the devious

of historical conditiona and phenoffi

thetic interpretation
we

that

ena

external

systems

venerate

sufficientlj:

whose power

which are now practically
themen whose

sustaine7 t hem.

tain the sense and extent
bear

in

mind

the

state

the

evils

dy,

and the different

there was
es

in

In

early times

there

practical

vendible.
has

those reasons

given a more p afect

we

reasons why

there were chang-

there w ere good,
in

have ceised -to exist and
conception

of the relations

is

not :Jo much du~e

inherent

it

is

to the

of old

builded just

the best

dor,_nd,

action were not

it

as

them,

afford a reme-

of debtor : nd creditor,
superiority

doctrines,

view of society be-

reasons vohy things
If

and

to ascer-

produced

of maintenance;

the nature of nan and of his

solid,

or

of things to which theyr are

fore this horror was dissirated;,

time

systems

of their

of society which

such a horror

obsolete,

in order

for which they -were intended to

now applicable.

of

genius coneeived an-

We must,

state

virtues

the

to appreciate

fully

able

are

true rea-

It is only by a just and sympa-

of the English law.

sons

the

to history that we cantrace

by recurrence

only

1 is

course which justice was forced to follow.

fact

that

Lo our own
those men
/

they knew with the~rude ma-

10

terials at hand.
however,

Besides,

the horror of irainbenanece

chapperty which animated the breasts of

lish judges,

could be no valid
in rerum natura,

sold was

attempt should be

In

he eye of the

sale unless the

thing to be

an"nder the immediate control

The Lw regarded it

of the vendor.

as absurd that an

made to accomplish a sale when the

thing to be sold was not in
Consequently it

seller.

early Eng

the

there was another reason which helped to

form the logicil basis of this rule.
law there

and

the actial ownership of the

prevented

such sales by falling

back upcn the rude common-sense notion that

if

you had

not a thing you could not sell it.
But whether these reasons were
fact temains:
choses in

the con-non law rule

that possibilities

or

action were not assignable was well nigh abso-

Only two excertions were countenanced by the

lute.
courts.

The

King could always either grant or receive

a possibility or chose in
such

good or bad the

action by assign-ent without

ransaction receiving the condemlnation of the court.
232 b n. 1;
Co Litt.
Coin. Dig. (Assigninentl D. 555;
Miiles v. Williams, 1 Pr- Wis. 252;
Stafford v. Buckley , 2 Vesey 177-181;
. ) 12.
3 Peters (U.

11

'rhe other exception which crept half scared into the dm
of the common law judges because of the

cisions

w:-s the

subject matter of the transfer,

of the

nature

TIey might be as.igned with compara-

case of annuities.

No doubt

Gerard v. L-oden (hetl. 80).

tive freedom.

eculiar

this exception of annuities from the operation of the
law was
that

it

thorpughly illogical;

but it

was perhaps felt

would be noticeably burdensom:e

if

this verty com-

mon species of personal estate should not enjoy the same
of alienability which were possessed by per-

privileges

sonalty in possession.

Anyhow the exception

is

well es-

tablished.
in

Choses

action not being assignable

at

law it

followed that the person to whom they were assigned could
not at law sue in his own name.

Indeed,

tion is an essential part of the assignrnent
the law.

It

he right od a&
as viewed by

must be remembered that in early English

history the protection of the poor against the oppress ion
of the rich,
it or,

the debtor against the exactions of the

cre

was one of the great occasions which called for juespecially on the part

dicial interference,
cellor.

Could we

in

of the Chan-

any wise logically separate the

12

right of action from the assignrent
perceive how futile it
self and still

proper,

we readily

would be to prohibit the act it-

when that act was accomplished,

enrich

the wrong doer with the fruits of his illegal effort.
This,

the

early jurist plainly foresaw,

wo 1d change

the sword of the enemy from his left hand to his right,
thus endangering the security of private prope~rty ar
liberty of the individual.

the

13

III.

C H A P T E R

ASSIGNd

THE ATTITUDE OF EQUITY TOWARD THE
MENT OF CITOSES IN ACTION.

From a very early date courtsr f

equity viewed as-

kance the common law principle which prohibited almost
unqualfiedly the assignment

of things in action.

That

system which Lord Coke considered the "Perfect ion of hurran wisdom",
barous or,

the

court of chancery regarded as semi-barnarrow and absurd.

to say the least,

upon the principle
thing which is

not

that a man ray bind himself to do anyimpossible,

form his obligations when not

held that the assignmnent
able

and that he ought to perequity has

illegal,

of a thing in

given effect to assignments
interest

alwayFs

action for a valu-

consideration ought to be enforced;

contingent

"Acting

and Irs also

of every kind of fUture and

and possibility

in real

or personal

property when rude upon a valuable consideration."
2 Eq. L. C. 1531; 1 Ves. Sr. 409I Ch. Rep. 29; 1 Ch. Cas.
3r/-381;
4-8; 2 Atk. 417-421;
33 IT
.. J. Nq. 614; 91 Pa. St.
96. 3 Met. 121; but see L. R. 8 Eq. 69 ; 2 Story
Rep. 630; 35 Cal. 378; 45 Mvo. 106; 3 Robt.(V. Y.
104; 41 Vt. 533; Ligelo~i on Estoplel 331.
I Ves.

Sr- 331;

411; 1 Pr. Will.

14
In the civil law and in the jurisprudence of the modern

seem to be any foundation for

in

name

arxi for

the

against

countries

flourishing of the conmercial

the most

Europe

an objection

They seem to lave been assigned

of debts.

assignment

does not

of Continental Europe -here

nations

commercial

the most part

suit

of

could be broughtin the

assignee.

of the

Pothier on Sales (by Cushing) n. 550, 55-55'd;
et hypoth. torn. I. n. 340-343;
Troplong des privil.

In

Art.

of France,

Civil Code

212;

the code of Jl:stinian the same

"Nomdnis autem venditio

is

attitude

manifest:

(Code

versus quem actiones mandantur, contrahi sol-et."
Lib. 8, tit. 42,

1.).

It

is also a matter of common knowl

edge that bills of exchange were trasnferable
able at a very early date;
fl-ll

in

effect

L.

(1 Doi-at.
exceptions

ample,

4,

might

Secs.

the title even though made
and

agsinst

3 and 4).

be round

the will
Slight

of the debtor.

and infrequent

to this Teneral rule

s for ex-

where the liws of a part icular and isolated courn-

try especially prohibited
stances,

it

it,

or hwere,

ias in

certain in-

was not drawn with all the due f~rrn-iti

andi requisites of the eustomary bill
in

or assign-

and an assignelient wo ld have

transferring

the knowledge

without

ad-

eo,

et ignorqnte, vel invito

these exceptions

of exchange.

the courts did not reject

s
Even

them from

15

but rather from a sense of pos-

a sense of outragedfor,,
sible,

if

not probable,

Long experience had

d:.nger.

taught that only an instrument

in the precise stereotyped

form could be used in transferring debts without loss to
some innocent party;

and any variation

from that form

would give imediate notice of an opportunity for fraud.
Equity, ni'ore liberal in its views,
led in

the administration of justice,

and less trammelN

followed in the

footsteps of progress and heeded the voice of necessity.
As before stated, from a very early period _1ssignments
which found no place in the narrow justice of the law
found response for their necessity in the liber al heart
of equity.

The Irrinciples upon which equity carried

those assignnents into effect were precisely the same as
those upon which they enforced

the p.erformance

nrnt when not contrary to their own rules o ..
icy.(ireem. Ch.
sigrnment",

Rep.

145; 1 Pr. Will.

observes Lord Hardwicke,

way of agreement

o-

ation of the court,

contract,
to this,

381).

"always

amounting,
that

of an agre
public pol-

"Such an asoperates by

in the consider-

one agrees with anoth-

er to transfer or ruake good rha . right or interest,
(Wriht
. Wigh,

IVes.

Sr. 412),

arid like any other

any other

agreement,

cific

plerformed

di

tion for danages)

the coitrt will cause it

where the assignor

the assignee

,-s a debt issuing out

or to

is ac-

is in a condition

cause it

It was but

red to his as:ignee."
t iat

to

( not leaving the assignee

to transfer the property,

then,

to b.e spe-

to be transfer-

a natural consequence

of an ordinary thing in

7ction,

of a contract relation, acquired

an immediate equitable ownership therein -o far as

it

is

possible to predicate property or ownership of a sTecies
of right;

and

the assignee of can expectancy, possibility,

or contingency acquired the right of exercising control
over thhe proceeds as fast as they cae
ence

on the ground that

the

ion.

(10 H. of L. 191)

expectancy or contingency
present

had been transformed into

into actual exist-

interest

in possessin

Eqity stretched its hand a-

cross the interval of tine and upheld the right of the
assignee until he was ready to receive it in use.

The

absolute possessorV right was held in abeyance by the
very nature of the

thing assigned until the equitable

ownership should ripaZ into
sessionsa arid enjoymrent
t ed event•

he sbsolute right of pos-

on th, happening of the ant icipa-

17

the assignee

been observed that

has already

It

the settled rule

in

assignee

gal the

the assignnent
sue in

the thing in

If

his own name.

can be sued

The equitable

.

his own name does not in

of assignable
tion which,
signable;

things;

it

le-

itself

action is

obtains a legal interest

of

as a result

rule that an assignee cn
any way enlarge the list

simply applies to things in

tested by other principles and rules,

and if

is

it

,ction

in

all the states where ehoses

are allowed to be assigned that the assignee
in

But

name.

in action could not sue in his own

chose

of a

actt

are

as-

they are of such a legal character that

at law the assignee would be permitted to sue in

the as-

signor's narre then the interest

is

le-

It

must

gal.

(63

be strictly

N. Y. 8),

observed that if

purely equitable
courts

50 Ind.

in

its

still

a thing in
or if

of equity alone recognize-as

part of a single demandis

319; 38 Wis.

nature,

order given upon a particular

equitable.

of the assignor
542).
action is

it

is

a claim

one which the

for example,

fund or an ass ignrent

then the ass ignor's

(Pomeroy' s Eq. Jur.,

Vol.

an
of

interest
III. p.

285 ).
As to the things in action which are or are not as-

18

signable.

The

following rule is given by Mr.

"All tiing, in action which survive

and pass

Pormeroy"

to the

sonal repre:Dentatives of a decedent creditor as

p-er-

assetts,

all continue as liabilities against the representatives
of a decedent debtor, are in general thus assignable;
all which do not thus survive but

lie with the pirson oft

the debtor or creditor, are n ot assignable.
of these

The first

classes, according to the doctrine prevailing

throughout the United States,

includes all claims aris-

ing from contract express or implied, with certain well
defined exceptions; and those arising from torts to real
or personal property, and from frauds,

deceits, and oth-

er wrongs, whereby an estate, real or personal, is injurd
ed, diminished or damacred.

The

second class embraces

all torts to the person or character where the injury and

daLage are confined to the bodyand. thefeeling; aiil also
those contracts, often implied, the breach of which produces only direct injury and damage, bodily of mental,
to a person, such as promises to rmarry, injuries done by
the want of skill of a medical practitioner,
his implied undertaking, and the

like;

contrary to

'::nd ..lso those

contracts, so long as they are executory, which stipu-

19

lte solely for the special persoml services,

(Por. Eq. Jur- Vo

knowledge of a contracting party".

th.s see that large classes

m.y be assigned
ian
n

.

1275 and cases cited).

III. Sec.
We

skill or

assignments

But

law or in equity.

both at
:,r-ich

of things

action

in

(are

there

are prohibited by the law as af a chose in ac-

.,ny assignraent

gainst public policy.

tion ;wihich violates the law of charmpert.
as operating merely to encourage

and.-maintenance,

litigation, are held

void both at law and in equity.

In England a person

cannot assign his salary or other

emolunent

for past or

future service to the country which is r&rrarded as honorary or which dignifies the person by labelling him as a
(T. and R. 459; L. R

quasi-public individual.
109).

It is probable that

in the United States any pub-

lic officer would ba 1.llowed to assign his
ary provided no statute
ed it.

7 Ch.

official sal-

expressly or impliedly prohibit-

Still the following have been held to be not as-

signable:-

the salary

(BeaJe v. MdcVicken,

, not

8 Mo.

defendant

of a public

App ;202);Claims

United States in some cases;
Minn. 327)

yet due,

office

againstthe

in Becker v. Sweetzer

(15

retained the plaintiff in aiding

20

him to collect a claim due him from the United States
for services
tribe for

nrade

and for

fifth,
to

the plaintiff

of

said clims;

courts

provision;

for the

and

such suns defendant

rf

of the:,, Sioux

payment of which claims the United States

tie

had already
paynent

rendered to certain Indians

was

ascertainment

one

to pay plaintiff

consideration tssigna and

that

transfer
par to

an equal and undivided one fifth
this

assignment

(Wanless v. U. S.,

v. Braynard, 3 Daly 183;

and

was held void by the cout

6 Ct.

of Cl.

123;

St Paul R. R. v. U.

Danklesson
.

112 U. S.

733; a presumption of right, Whitney v. Buckman, 13 Cal
536;

a bare right to

Fargo, 45 Mich. 153;
f;ardner
Mich?

v.

624;

Adairs,

a mere right

12 Wend.

Linton v.

so held, "tilat

file a bill in equity, Dayton v.

297;

of action for

a tort,

Dickinson v. Seaver, 44

-fervey, 104 Mass. 353.).

It

is al-

an order drawn on a frind for only a part

thereof does not amount. to an assignment

of that part,

f'r

be prermitted to

tie reason that a creditor shall not

split up a single cause of action itto many actions with.
out the assent

of the debtor.

In other words-----

a part only of a chose in action cannot >e assigned1 1 without the consent

of

the debtor.

(Bispham's Prin. of Eq.

21

p.

But in

219 and cases cited).

Indiana sich an assign-

ment nay be sustained for certain persons.
v.

Duffy (47 Ind.

and the court in

51),

part

In Lapping

of a judgrrent was assigned,

considering

the question observed "We

think it does not follow that there rmust be diverse actions, if' the cssignent of part of the judgment is rec-

ment may unite in

the judg-

The several parties owning

ognized as valid.

an action upon it".

But the court

does not decide this point as the judgment was given on
the ground that

the judgement

debtor and the defenlant

Duffy assented to the assignrrnt
to the plaintiff.

It

is

the

of la rt

2;%ener~l

of the

rule

judgment

that a mu-

nieipality is not bound to recognize such a partial assignmrent
App.

of a contract

8'3 Pa.

money is
431).

St.

I9).

to which it

is

(Phil.

The lien of a vendor for purchase

not assignable

(Richards v.

Nor can a contract founded in

dence and trust,

a party.

(Landon v.

McCarthy,

Learning,

27 Ill.

a personal
45 Mio.

106);

r ght of entry for a condition broken (Mcviahon v.
34 Barb.

56);

nor the right

by action (Bouton v.
v.

Jarrett,

58 Tenn.

Smith,
454).

to cancel usurious
26 Barb.

635,

confinor a
Allen,

contracts

but see~ Spicer
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procedure of many of the states of the Union

the

In

principles both of law amd of equity are applied by the
so that the assignee,

same court;

equity,

at law or in

Moreover,

bunal.

legal

try tht a

presents his claim to

of a legal

assignment

and the

interest

Even where

legal in its character.

his own name;

and where

in

essentially
action

the thing in

of law would

the assignee must sue in

still

not formally recognize,

action

assignee can sue

or such as the courts

equitable,

this coun-

thing in

action which is

his own nake only by a civil

is

the same tri-

generally decided in

is

it

cnnfers only E legal

assigned

whether his remedy be

there are no principles

peculiar

to equity to be .:pplied his procedure and remedy would be
to .ll

intents and purposes legal.

depended

on the application

the equitable

We have

recovery

of purely equitable

doctrine

of the

juriddiction

and the procedure

But if the

and remedy would be equitable

thus far

noticed

the

invoked

court would be

salient

in

nature

points of dif-

ference between the attitude

of law and equity towards

the assignments of choses in

action.

cussion has been generol.

It

Thus far the dis-

ires been shown how the

early common law absolutely refused to recognize the assignnent

of a chose in

action or anything not in

esse"

23"

We have next to consider

particularly the attitude of

equity toward some other assigrments which the 1aw refused to recognize, but especially of asignrents of D
fund.

IV.

CHAPTER

T0IN EQUITY

WHAT COULD LiE ASSIGNED

tH1OUGH NOT AT LAW.

"A Tarty may purchase the whole interest
in a contract or security or other

of another
in

property which is

litigation, provided there be nothing in the contract
that savors of maintenance".

That is,

provided he does

not attempt to pay any costs nor make any other advances
ielond the i.ere support

of !he exclusive interest which

he alleges to have nequired.
Bing. 309;

(Williams v. Prolheroe, 5

Grill v. Levy, 16 C. B. n. s. 73).

fectly clear that

a person ma-y assign the

It

equitable

is pep
in-

terest which arises under a contract for the conveyance
of real property.

A person claiming under

such an orig-

inal contract may sell or otherwise assign the equitable
interest so accruing to him under the transaction;
stands

in

equity in

those persons
ble interest.

and he

the position of a trustee for all

who are

p urchasers

Moreover

it

from him of his equita-

has been held

in

numerous

cases that "Equity not anly allows but actually compels
him to Ipermit the sub-purchasers to use his namre in all

25

proceedings for obtaining the benefit of their contract."
(Deaver v. Elleru, 7 Ired. Eq. 24; Dibble v. Scott, 5
Jones's Eq. 164).

Such proceedings would have

been

deemed shocking by the conservative and unalterable
judges of the conrnon law.

In the same manner,

if there

should be a trust estate in land either actual or con
structive, w-ich however is denidd by the trustee, still
the cestui que trust may assign his allegeddinterest and
the assignee may in equity enforce his right to the interest under the trust.(Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sunner 475).
In Hartley v. Russell( 2 Sim. & Stu. R. 244,(, a creditor
who had instituted

proceedings at law and in equity a-

gainst his debtor, entered into an agreerent with said
debtor whereby the creditor ,vas to relinquish certain
securities which he held of the debtor providing the de
debtor-would give him a lien upon other securities
the hands of another creditbr;

in

The debtor was to give

the creditor authority to institute proceedings against
such other creditor and aid him in all ways to collect

from the securities.

In equity it was held that the a-

greement was valid 2nd not maintenance.

Th ese illus-

trations are suffic ient to show how far the courts of eq-

26

uity Will-.go in carrying out assignments which in law
would be wholly disregarded.
to the

A mere expectancy, as that of an heir at le

estate of his ancestor, could be assigned in equity.
(Hobson v. Trevor, 2 Pr. Will. 191; Wethered v. Wethered,
2 Sim. 183-192; Steele v. FreeborI 3 S. W. (tenn) 649;
but see Alves v. Schlessinger, 81 Ky. 290).
might assign a "-e.vy or a share of

A person

a residue.

The in-

terest which one might take under the will of a person
then living (Beckley v. Newland, 2 Pr. Will. 182);

or the

sl are to which a person may become entitled under an appointment

(musprat v. Gordon,

1 Anst.

34)

or in

the per-

sonal estate as presumptive next of kin of a person then
living

(hinde v.

Blake,

3 Beau. 235); all these are

signable in equity for a ualuable consideration

as-

and

when the expectancy has fallen into possession the asThe assignment of future
signrent will be enforced.
freights, of future patent rights, of the profits arising from ths working of patents by a licensee, of future
dividends upon proof in bankruptcy, of the future cargo
of a ship, of building material to be brought on the
premises

or machinery at a future time to be added to or

substituted for

existing nachinery,

of goods ani chat-

27

tels now being or which shall hereafter be in or about a
messuage or house,
v.

App.

Ch.

Bergnam
Div.

Ch.

597;
v.

Printing do.

419;

In

272; Holroyd v.

R. C. P.

12 Ch. Div.

erate ,:s a present alienation,
at

court;

is

perfect

Beall v.

Coe,

(Pierce V.

23 How.

117;

.:',hite, 4 Otto,

key Brook Coal Co.

existence cannot opthere

rrent

all

is

nothing
of the

,-cquisition, the as-

whose title

(9

.R.

,orril

387).

L. R.

Co.,

to

Eq.

the personalty,

in

24 Wis.

v. Moyes,

In

the chose

551;

56

Pen-

465;
-e.

the Matter of the San-

721),

the (irectors at-

tempted to mot'tga-;e or charge the plant
cluding_

Of course a

and cannot be disturbed by execution creditors

of the assignor.
nock v.

of

of the transfer ma-

or immediately upon its

signor h ids for the assignee,

.

10

to the mandate

but as soon as the subjeat

teri-lizes,

Marshall,

because

the time which can be subject

17

Brown v.

269;

314).

to trnasfer property not in

462;

re Irving,

In

8 Price,

re Ship Ware,

191; Ex Part'7 Games,

contract

423;

Div.

F. Eq.

19 L.

Sampson,

v.

R.

3 L.

Tanner,

228; Brown v.

17 Ch.

McMillan,

Bateman 2 1.
L.

& Sal.

5 M.1an.

McDonld,

(Robinson

equity.

in

enforceable

i.

.nd

property

in-

order to secure the repay-

of money borrowed for various

rurposes.

It

was

2(9

the proceeds of a call already made but not

held that

paid might be charged,

yet

In

ture call.

this

but not -he

mortgages

on per:sonal property to be acquired

ture are

valid in

tunie acquisitions,

equity;

153,

154,

mortgages

Lester,

Conn.

Galveston

577;

Smithurst
made

v.

R. R. Co.
14 Ii.

by bridge commissioners

futu

of fu-

on Mort.

107 Pa.

48 lis;. 513; Walker v.

Edmunds,

the

given by railroads on rollig

*52; Collin's Appeal,

Sitters v.

in

Zas are also assignments

ing stock and other -rersonal property.(Jones
Secs.

fu-

well established thit

is

country it

proueeds of

v.

J.

Coudry,

Equ.

438).

St.

590;

Vaughn,

33

11 Wall.

459;

A contract

of a county to pay a cer-

tain sum of money for a bridge subscribed therein and for
the Prection thereof uponthe

completion of such bridge

as fast as th.e money is

collected byr the tax collector,

is

ilubbard,

assignable.(Smith

A mechanic's

lien,

(McDonald

KIelloy,

v.

v.

although inchoate,
14 T.

1. 35).

lien for services on a judgemnt.
31

in.

2

W.I.

(Tenn.) 569).

is assignable,
So is

(Sibley v.

an att-rney(s
Pine Co.,

201).

From these
are given in

examples

and illustrations

the note appended to the case

rmany of which
of Ryall v.

29

Rowles,

of White & Tudor's Leading Cases

in Vol.

will serve

to show in part what

assignments

in Equip

were valid

in equity which :Tere held void at the cormon lawreported cases

and

them are legion,

cross references

illustrations

and only a bare outline

portant principles
so small compass.

the resulting

can be given in

The

under

of

the most imp

a work of necessarily

I have examined a large number of the
and there number and ramifications

so large and bewildering

are

that the hope of a somewhat

thorough and orderly discussion of two or three of the
leading cases on each primKciple and exception has been
abandone d.

30

C I A P T E RV.

VJI-AT AL UITS
~TO AN EQUI'IIABLE ASSIGIT"-1GE1,7

N o certain or particular
in
in

is

neces,;ary

order to make a valid equL.. able assignment
action. (Rowe v.
1 Yes.
'awson,Sr. 331;

Spier,

13 Sire. 4'9;

Lewisburg v.
Me.

form of words

Marsh,

41; Conway v.

Tingle v.

Fisher,

20 W. V.a

10 Norris 100; Duck v.

Cutting,

51 K. i.

407).

condition,

being due to differences
and not in principle.

(sui-ra 1.

In

E.

36

The English
the mrnor

tn circ'-mstances

and

',he great English case

s to what constitutes an equitable
Row v. Dawson

497;

Swazly,

and American rules are practically the same,
differences

of a chose

assignrent

that case it

is

that

of

appeared that

one Gibson had lent money to p-arties under whom the defendnat

cla imed and !,ave tkem -n

deputy of Horace Y1alpole,
chequer,

for the payrent

from YUalpole
person,
The

out

order on Swinburne,

who was an officer
out of the monies

of the Exchequer,

and200 ppunds

to the other',

question was wheth~or these

of

persons were

be classed as equitable assignees

of the ex-

due to him

400 pou.nds

"value

the

to one

received".
entitled

to

of the monies due from

31

the exchequer

to the est-lte of Gibson,

a bankrupt.

It

equitable

assignment

Warmstrey v.

th.t

was held

ed by Ryall v.

Rowles

Banister (3 Q. B. D.

(1 Ch.

( 1 Ves.
569)

make the assignrrent
specificall

,

case followed

29)

and was

348,),

These case:s

no partieular words are.
of a chose

must be a clear
tltt

in

the fund or property must be

pointed out-

and that there must be an ab-

of the transaction-

In

the sub-

other words,

ident principle to be deduced from the cases
agreement

action

intention to

solute appropriation of the r.'roperty which is
ject matter

follow

and Bryce v.

decided in 1878.

necessary to create an assignn-ent
there

The
Rep.

Sr.

uniformly lay dovn the rule that

or a fund -that

order amounted to an

the

of the funds.

Lady Tanfield

ho having become

is

between a debtor and a creditor that

the ev-

that

an

a debt ow-

ing shall be paid out of a specific fund comirg to the
debtor and such acts accompany the agreement
it
ee,

as indicate an appropriation

of the

or

follow

fund to the assign

or an order given by a debtor to his creiitor upon a

third person having funds
itor out of such funds,

of the debtor,

will

assignixent of so much money.

to pay the cred-

create a binding equitable

(Benjamin on Sales,

pp.

62-

32

Banister

67; Bryce v.

,

of Ex parte Alderson(l L.,add.
arose,

Sir Thons Plunmer ]J.

vation:-

this draft

"Is

assignrrent

53)

the decisive case
same question

wiere the

nade the following

R.

is

a chose

obser-

equity as an

to be considered in
-hich

of the debt,

In

supra;).

in

action?

did not tihe executor bind himself to pay it?

And

I think it

was a good equitable assignment" since the property had
been specifically pointed out and alpropriated tthl-ntent to charge.
always be shown.

The intention to create a charge must
Thus a mere authority to a person to

draw to the extent of a specified amount,
ple,

a mere

letter

will not amount to an equitable
Forster

check an equitable
the

,

for exam-

of instruction to a banke-r not written

with any intent to create a charge

(Hopkinson v.

as

(19 L.

assirnment

bankers upon whom it

is

on a fund in his handq

assignment

R. Eq.

74).

of the fund.
Nor is a

of the drawer's

balance at

drawn.(Hopkinson v.

Forster.

supra).
With practicall,'

all

the principles thus laid down

by the English courts the law of this country is

in uni-

son as the following examination willshiow.
What is

necessary to constitute a valid equitabl-e

33

assignment has been well expressed by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Case of Christmu's v. Russell
(14 Wall. 69)

The Court, spenaking through Mr. Justice

Swayne, says- "An agreement
fund,

to py out of a particular

owever clear in its terms,

is not an equitable as-

a covenant in the most solemi form has no

signment;

greater effect.

The phraseology employed is not materiSuch

al providing the intent to transfer is manifested.
an intent and its execution are indispensable."

To make

an equitable assignment, there must be such an appropriation of the subject nmatter as to confer a complete and
present right on the pi.arties intended to be provided for,
even where the circumstances do not admit of its imrediate exercise.
Barb. 454)
gave

In the Case of Dickinson v. Phillips(l

the defendant being indebted to the plaintiff

him security on a schooner, agreeing at the same

time that he would procure
transmit

an insurance on the uessel and

the policy to the creditor.

insured t-he schooner in the narre
informed plaintiff
hold the

He subsequently

of G, a third party,

that he had done so and that

and

G would

insurance subject to the order of the plaintiff.

Notwithstanding these statements and allegations the

34

the transaction as an equita-

court refused to recognize
bel assignment.

Ilarr is,

the court said:--"It
words is

is

J.,

deliverirvr

the opinion of

that no T-rticular form of

true

necessary to constitute

an equitable

assi-2nmert •

But there mrst at least be evidence of an intention to
appropriate

the fund)"

It

seems

defendant tere not sufficient

in

that the acts of the
the judgment

of the

court to make the transactionan equitable assignment.
However,
fit

where

a purchaser

subsequently procures the building to be in-

and he

sured,

but does not assign the policy to the

agreenent

upon the policy,

an assignrent
39 Larb.
Tie

in

the

v.

but not as

Insurance Co,

227).
question as to what

in

sufficient

of a fund was

to constitute

quite thoroughly da

Bogy (44 Llo.

13).

phe

drawn upon a debtor does not of it~

operate as an assirgnment

is

is

Lank of Coimmerce v.

court said,-"A bill

it

case of loss,

of the policy.(Cromwell

an equitable assignment
discussed

vendor,

operqtes as an equitable asa grmn-t of the mon-

ey payable

en if

to insure for the bene-

of his vendor and to assign the policy for his secu-

rity,

self

agrees

in

equity of the

debt,

negotiated for a good consideration."

ev-

And

o5

Kimball v. Donald(20 Mo. 517) state3 the rule

Any-

thus:

thing which shows the intention on the nne side to make
a present

irrevocable transfer of the fund, and from

which an c&nent to receive it can be inferred from the
other, wil

operate in equity as an assignment,

ported by

sufficient consideration".

tis,

(ess

if sup-

il v. Alne-

56 Barb. 362; Noyes v. Brown, 33 Vt. 431; Arpin v.

Lurch, 32 N. W. 681; Gage v. Dow, 59 I. H. 383; Bower v.
Bluestone Co.,

30 L.

J. Eq. 171).

But in Georgia, where

the thing assigned is a chose in act ion, the assig nment
nst be in writing (Insurance Co. v. Walrar, 30 Fed.
1,ep. 653).
Upon this examination of a few of the earlier leading cases on what constitutes an equitable assignment,
we begin to perceive what it is

be-

that equity requires

fore it will take cognizance of an alleged -,ssignment.
In the first place there must be a clear intent, either
express or implied, to apropriate the fund.

It

is the

first maxim of the law as well as of equity that great
diligence and
give

force and

that intent is

care must always be observed in order
effect

to the intent of

the parties,

to
if

not illegal or the carrying out of the

n-

36

tent does not contravene
c~rnot find in

the transaction itself

T1e reason for this is
ty itself.

found in

such an intent.

the very nature of equi-

Equitable principles exist

to litigants;

to give justice

and this never can be done by manufactur-

ing intent or by giving false

interpretation

to t~'iose al-

Another reason why equity requires

ready existing.

clear intent to apropriate
doctrine of equitable
contrary

an intent to appro-

will never manufacture

the fund it

priate

the court

If

public rpolicy.

is

a

found in the f'wt that the

assignments

is

to the early common law.

entirely foreign and
It is a primitive

doctrine of the law that no action on contract

can be

maintained in

a court of law except among parties between

w.,om there is

a privity of' contract

relation.

No doubt

this extremely technical rule has been softened considerably by contact
uity;

so that

with the more elastic principles of eq-

at the present

time

an action can be maintained by, A.
for

his benefit

But this

is

most of

id

states

not privy to

opposed to

of the common law as is

the

upon a promise made

to B. even though A.

the consideration.
principles

in

the original

shown by the greaL

controversy which has arisen concerning

one phase of the

37

in

subject exemplified
Fox(20 I'qw York 2

and
i); equity,

before modifying the

always requii'es good and sufficient reasons

common law,
shown.

the New York case of Lawrence v.

One of tiae most important of these reasons
intent .

clear unequivoc.l

(Brill v.

Tuttle,

is

a

81 N. Y.

454).
Another pre-requisite
mont

Af

a fu-nd is

its absolute

as the debtor exercises
saction is
it

is

to a valid equitable
appropriation.

equivocal because his retaining control over

creditor alleges

it

Iroperty.

transfers

The righi

an ownership to

transfe-rred
It

ble lion or charge.

is

A valid
equitable

more than an equita-

as an equitable property and own-

But owinership implies absolute and unqu alified

cont:.rol by the assignee
proceeds,

of the thing assigned or its

Therefore when the alleged assignot retains

control over the fund he exercises
that

the property

person.

to which the

to have been dedicated.

equitable assignment

ownership;

So long

control over the fund the tran-

legally inconsistent with the purpose

ership.

assign-

is

to

say,

inconsistent

Hquity

the prerogatives

he exercises
with

of

a dominion over

the dominion of any otherz

takes him at his word,

or rather his

38

and irfuses to recognize any other ownership by con-

act,

str'uing the transaction
It

has, therefore,

into an equitable assignment

been uniformly adjudged in this coun-

try th at the transfer of" the fund to the control of the
assignee must be absolute.
One of the earliest New York cases in substantiation
of this position is Rogers v.
Wend.

319).

Here one,

Gracie,

Hosack's Executore

(18

had covenanted with the

plaintiffs to p'ay them the balance of their debt with
certan French funds when he should receive them.

This

was held by the court not to be an equitable assignment
of the fuid.

It

seems plain that had Graeie survived

the treaty by which the French funds were to be obtained,
the i.!aintiffs might have sued him at law for not paying
their share as per contract.

only remdy.
pledge,

fhis

There was no assigrnment,

but a re re covenant

being received by the covenantor.
does not create
re Holmes,

Everett,

no mortgage,

no

no order, or any othe specific appropriation of

the French fund,

(In

would have been their

to lay them on their
Such an agreement

any lien either at law or in
2 Rose's Cas.

14 East,

in Bankr.

582; Clayton v.

equity.

355; Williams

Fawcett,

2 Leigh,

v.
19;

39

Burton,

Brainard v.

tho Uni-led SLates

the

court

on

ion was followed in
Washington
(b

its

1831 by

(5 Peters 389),
In

Peters 580.

ment

the

duplicate

ee to ay a specified
to the
or.
the
in

persons
It

was here

indorsement
the

was not

assignment

ee for a pntion

of the

here

is

in

while

sale,

Tiernon v.

the

that,

sufficient

the

of

an assign-

tobacco was (,n

consign-

of their
the

on a

sales

consign

ciircumstarres,

of action against
of (he

assignment

the importart

Jackson

to give a payee named

proceeds
rThe

proceeds

under

dec isin

by indorsen-ent

creditors

is

Shanckland v.

andwhich directed the

a right

received to his use.
be (a.

made

who were

held

in

There

apj-ro-

This

case there was

sum from the

named,

fund the

and also

latter

invoice,

an order

unequivocal.

consignees for

of the

through Justice

where

the court

of a cargo of tobacco,
way to the

that

rgenerul or particular

must be absolute and

1820,

in

a similar manner.

in

laid down the doctrine

dr wn either
priation

speakin7

court

down the principle

b .id

Story,

Supreme

case

early

the

decided

27/),

(5 Wheat.

Welcb

v.

of Mandeville

In

97).

5 Term Rep.

point)

the

sales
did not

consign-

as money

purport to

an absolute trans-

fer of all the interest of the assignor in

thetobacco,

so

40

put

as to divest him of control over its ranagerment arni
it inmnediately at the risk of the assignee.

The

evidently contemplated a sale to be made by the
aid the assignemat was not

rties

co nsigne,

of the tobacclo itself immedi-

ately, but a portion of the fund to arise from its sale
at a future period.

It did not pass nor purport to pass

the legal title in the tobacco or its proceeds, but merely created an equitable interest
sale,

in the proceeds after

for the benefit of the assignees.
In New York the case of Roger v. Hosack's Executors

(supra) and Dickinson v. Phillips(supra) have beenuniformly followed in
of a

holding that no equitable

fhind or other prope'rty would be recognized

by a court unless

tion may be evinced in many ways.
th t

as such

there had been an unqualified appropri-

ation of the prop rty br the assignee.

is

assignment

This

appropria-

The most usual way

of an unrestricted delivery of the order to the

assignee or payee.

T is is clearly stated by Judge Ra-

pallo in Brill v. Tuttle (81 N. Y. 454).

The

following

is his language:'-"There can be no doubt as to the rule
that when, for a valuable consideration from the payee,
an ordler is

drawn upon a third prty and made payable

of a particular fund,

out

then due or to becomne due from him

41

to the d awer,

the delivery

erates as

an assiFnrent

dry'wee is

bound,

of the order to the Iayee op-

protant o of the fund,

after rnotice of such ass ignrint , to ap-

ply the fund as it

case in

of Brill

of the

to the payment

accrues,

and to no other purpose
T-e case

and the

order

".
v. Tutiujtle

(supra)

a leading

is

Now York on the equitable assignment

of a find

add the principles therein enunciated deserve further attentton.

rThese are the eacts:

pairing a house for the defendant
eration,
tiff,

A. and Co. who ware refor a valuable

executed and delivered an order

directed to defe ndant,

consid-

to the plain-

asking him to 1pay plaintiff

a certain sumn due the plaintiff from A. and Co. for materials furnished.

The work .vas ne;,rly done when the

order was executed.

It was held that the order did not

necessardly require a construction holding that
request to -ay in advarce the
rection therein,
cumstarc es,

intent to have been simply to

of such sums as were

to the drawers on the
mount

sp:ecified.

that the di-

in connection with the surrounding cir-

indicated tle

direct p ayment

sum specified;

it was a

"It

account
is

or might

for irepairs,

equally

become due

up to the a-

wiell established"

said

42

the court,

"

a draft be drawn generally upon the

that if

e, on -he

drawee, to be paid by him in the first insta

credit of the drawer and without regard to the source
from which the money used for its Fayrent is obtained,thi
desigination by the drawer of a particular fund out of
which the drawee

is to reimburse himself for such paymnt

or a particular accounf to which it is to be charged, wi
will not convert the draft into a consignment

of the fun4

and the payee of the draft can have no action thereon against the drawee unless he duly accepts.
therefore

In

all cases

in which a particular fund, to accrue in futuro

is designated in the draft, and the language is ambiguous, the turning point
the parties that

the payrmnt

the designated fund,
whether

is whether it was the intention of
should be make only out of

xhen or vhere it

should accrue,

the direction to the draw ee to pay was

to be absolute and the fund was

If

it

was

intended

_nientioned only as a

means of reimbursement, or an instruction
keeping."

or

:-s

to book-

the intention of the parties

that

the payment should be made only out of the designated
fund,

when or where

uitable assignment

it

should accrue,

pro-tanto

ii,

of the fund;

would be an eqbut

if

it

was

43

should be absolute,

ray~ent

t ~eir intention that the

nd

thle fund. V.-as ment ioned only as a source oi' re-ijnbur,.emefnt
it

,ould
Son-

not be an equii able assignment
authorities

case

v.

the

Telegraph Co.(57 N.

Mayor(4 Hill,

7,

L.

"Pay to A.

and chargetto

asd gnnnt;

&on eq'itable

different

from that

case

case

of difference

is

of Brill

v.

and

tre aurer

award number
This was

but

it

Tuttle.

is
The

a'very
first

thant Kel!y v. Mayot was not tIhe

of an order drawn by a creditor on a debtor and

able to a third person.
treasurer, at

the time,

It was vroved also,
:had no funds

from the Bedford Road assessment.
dent

$1500

Bedford road a,3sessment."

held to be not

loint

draft on the

or order,

263)

the former

In

459).

Y.

Mayor drew a negotiable

of the city:

Tuttle does

Brill v.

contend tl-t

bot follo-,w; the caeses of Belly v.
'haver

of such fund.

intention of' the Mayor was

should be payable

1-Y-

that the

in his hands arising
Moreover, the

not so much that

eviit

out of a particu ,.r fund, as that it

shouldbe regarded merely as instruction for

the

uid ance

of the treasurer to make plain the resp)ective acecounts
the city dertment.

The instrument,

ed its character as a negotiable

bill

therefore,
Zf exchange.

of

retain-
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Tel-

v.
A comparison of Brill v. Tuttle with Shaffer
egraph

discloses even

;o.

were observed in

than we

greater discrepancies

the comparisons

defendant wrote B, an employe

There

just imade.

the

he would make an

that if

order on the treasurer of the defendant ('f the defendant
of his salary to be paid to a third pern iart
for

son,

the sum named by B. would be paid monthly until B.

revoked the

order-.

B. took advantage of the offer orderThe order

ing a monthly sum to be paid to plaintiff.
was delivered to N.

and letter

tion, who flied thiem with the cashier.
wrote the treasurer saying that "if
countermanded the

order-

considera-

for a valuable
B.

subsequently

not accepted" he

Action was brought to

recover

the sums which defendnat refused to pay pl intiff.

In

o the case of Brill v. Tuttle we obcontradistinction
serve t'hatthe order was given by B. in pursuance of a
previous

drawer,

arrangement

with the

d~fendant whereby B.

ceedingly clear that this assignment
not

It is

could revoke the order at any time.

absolute.

miniorn~and

rjhe

ex-

or appropriation

is

drawer does not relinquish his do-

control over the fund.

drew actually

the

The order

gave notice to the drawee

that

it

which B.
was not

45

as an ubsolute

to be understood
that

should

that

it

,vas

to this

to the
made

B.

exercised that right

of the

conditions

to the

f

right

An-:, person taking the order tcok
rirlit.

action :,s the

the very stipulations

order

of which B.

In Lowery v. Steward

sub-

it

could be

on its

canta6ned

took advanta,_

(25 N. Y. 239),

B.

according

.!,-d no complaint

agreement

but

of' each month,

the reserved

to

always subject

to revoke it.
ject

the eni

payable :t

become

of the sum

assignment

face

.

a letter to the

consignee of cotton by the consignor stating that he had
drawn on the consignee for 500 payable to a third peso
when thre

cotton should be

specific

ppropriation of

as would amount to

was held
.old,to be

the fund to accrue

an equitable assignment

This case follows and sustains Hall v.
(1 Keyes,
city
the

193).

In

this

case

of Buffalo was largely
comptroller

of the

city,

who,

of the claims

against

parties,

in

The

fu~nd

to whom the

to the estab-

noticess

parties upon the

sane.

according

received

by third

of the

drew orders upon th

lished usage of the city,
the city

futuro

City of Buffalo

a contractor

indebted,

in

such a

favor of divers:

eld for the payment

or'ders'were held to be equivalent

of such cl'_ ms

o san equivalent
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(Peyton v. Hallet,

treasury of the city.

the

in

to an equitable assignmxent pro tanto of the funds

iCaines,

363;

Martin v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583; Field v. Moyor of New Yor4
2 Seld. 179;

Luff v. Pope, 5 Hill, 417; Harris v. Clark,

3 Comst. 93).

The

question in Parker v. City of Syrasame pro lem and deals

cuse(31 K. Y. 375) presents the

In Alger v. Scott(54 N. Y*

with it in the san-e way.
14),

an order was drawn by a landlord -pon his tenant in

August, 1866:-

"Pay to J.

. G.

346 and charge the se

to me, ace unt of rent of house 13 Cheever Place".
rent was due at

the time.

The tenant accepted the order

Th

but did not pay it at onee.
tion for the rent in

Nor

November,

landlord began an ac-

1866.

Defendant

rut

in

the order from the landlord and his acceptance of the
same as a defence.

The

court held it not a. good de-

fence because there was no

consideration for the equit;-

ble assignment and it was therefore void and the landlord could recover.
Munger v. Shannon,

(Ehrich v. DeMill, 7b N. Y. 370
l N. Y. 251; Risley v. Smith, 64 N.

Y. 576; Gibson v. Lenane,
B~nchard,

94 N. Y.

183;

Conselyea v.

103 N. Y. 222; Lanejr v. Dun, 115 N. Y. 405;

Fairbanks v. Sargent, 11l7 N. Y. 32 0).
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lawcan be main-

is well settled that no action at

It

tained by the payee against the drawee on sn unaccepted

10

Wall.

Bank v. Bank,

23;

ong, 100 Pa. S

Bank v.

d

69

Millard,
Busn1-

Sayles v.

45;

107 1AMass.

Eank,

152; Calrm v.

511;

120 U. S.

(Bank v. Schuuler,

oeck.

But

23 )

times as

there has been considerabLe di-pute at various

to whether c r not a check or draft drawn upon a fund more
to pay it

than sufficient
signment

of the amount

operates as an equitable as-

f'or which the check is

between the drawer and the payee.

drawn,

The Circuit Caurt

the United States has thrown the weight of its
in the affirmative.
Inst.

v.

as
of

authority

-ithe case of the German Saving

AdaeChief' Judge McCrary said:

"1ere

is

cer-

tainly no good grovindfor hold ing that a check or draft,
drawn upon a fund in bank,
ment

is

not an equitable

as between the drawer and

,where there

is

it

in

a case

does not lie in the mouth of the draw-

his assignee,

n~ot an equitable
the following

ani

no controversy as to the riahts of the

b.nk or drawee,
er or

he payee;

assign-

to say that

as . ghnt".

cases:

such can instrument

The

Roberts

v

same rule

Austin(26

Munn v.

But.ch (25 Ill.

65); Bank v.

Bank v.

Bank (114 Ill.

4-&i)

.

This

is

Iowa,

Patton(l0a

is

held

in

315);

Ill.

4i9);

point howyever has not
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been ipassed upon by the United States Supreme Court.

contrary to the doctrine
In

in England.
Church,
cleck is

J.,

C.

v.

Co.

Ins.

and

T.e;Yovk

(71

I.

"The doctrine

as follows:

Y.

(that

of

A check is a request

to pnay the wiole or a portion of such indebt-

customer

edness to the beared or to the order of the It yee.
til presented and accepted it
legal or

or interest,

title

325),

accords with the

an equit ble assignment)

not

in

established

General

Atty

spoke

as

relations between the parties.
a

But thi.; is entirely

120 U. S. 514).

(Bank v. Schuler,

Before

the fund.

equitable,

acceptance

deposit;

the bank owes

until it

is

presented

is inchoate;
in

Un-

it vests no
the payee to

the drawer may withdraw his

no duty to the holder of a check
for payment.

Knowledge that check

been drawn does not make it obligatory, on the bank

lve

to retain

the deposit

indispensable
ness.

to meet

them.

to the safe transaction

Any other rule

These rule s
of comercial

are
busi-

would produce confusion, andin-

volve banking institutions and all depositories of monies

in responsibility to conflicting claimants, which,

while producing great
eficial

purpoee.

embarassments, would serve no ben-

(Bank v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82;

Tyler v.

49

Gould,

48 N. Y.

682).

The Englsih co1Yrte -re

in

Forster,

L.

(Hopkinson v.

with t.hose of New York.
Eq.

.

19

74).
far discussed the two conditions ,iiich

We have thu',s

must concur before ;fl equitable ass ignment
can be made.
th1e absolute
is

'inison

The:; are

of the fund

the intention of the tarties,

apropriation of the subject matter-

ad
There

practical unanimity among the courts both of the Uni-

ted States.3 and Englend in
in attempting t(
appropriation,

lying

down tle

they sometimes differ.

It

can be general-

answer to the question,

do the goods rein. in,solves the problem,
encQintered

pends almost

is

in

answering

the

at whose risk
Thie only dif-

question.

It

entirely "pon the facts and circmstanes

each particular

but

arrive at just what acts constitute an

ly stated that the

fici)1t-

p:,rinciple;

case.

given so broad tlt

rio be sure,

illustrations

we can say unhesitatingly that

deof

can be
such

a state of facts could not possibly amount to an equit ble assignment;

or circumstcnes

could be

detailed so

clearly within the rule that we could declare as confidently that

this state

of facts must

tute an equitable ass i~nment.

inevitably

consti-

But between these two ex-

50

tre,mes

lie practically

gated;

and with reference to al

sy,

all the cases that are ever litithese,

each controver-

while being governed by the principles

down,

l.1ready

must of necessity be decided largely if'

ly wit.h reference
conditions.

to its

not

lb.id
entir*

own peculiar circumstarnes and

R

CHA PT

VI.

0NOTICE

It

EQUITIES.

-

is a familiar doctrine that whenever a debtor

makes to his creditor an equitable
cific fund or debt
the assent

in the hands of or owing by a debtor,
person is

of such third

of the

validity

absolute and is

of a spe-

assigrnent

andyet

assignment;
subject

the assignment

notified

has beet

transaction and,

either expressly or impliedly,

ed his assent.

(Scott

v.

This

It

is

for its

also a familiar

: sdgnment perfect
self

as well as an offer,

of authorities

that

is,

is

Garbut

an

contract-

and requires

support.

doctrine that

and valid as against

to render the

the assignor him-

to give the assi'nee a claim upon the

fund and a right of act ion to secure
the

manifest-

a complete

of the simple rule that

no citation

not

of the

652;

3 Meriv.

Porcher,

radd v. Lauderdale, 2 Russ. & M. 451).

requires an acceptance,

is

to revocation by the assignor at

any time before the assignee

illustration

to the

not necessary

it--

no notice of

assignment need be given to the debtor or other per-

son holding thefund.

It

is

not quite so certain whether

52

sucl1

a statement

to those who

can be made with respect

are rebh ted to the assignor as judgment creditors and
rere volunteers unde- him.

It

has been so held,
(Beavan v.

er, by eminent English courts.
6 D. G. ,M. & G. 492; Kinderly v.

Jervis,

But when we turn from the ansideration
between the assignor :,nd the ass. gnee,

howiev-

Lord Oxford,
22 Beav.

1).

f the relations
to a view of

those subsisting between the assignee and the debtor- or
the holder of the fund or subsequent assirnees,

it

is

at

once evident that the reasons which control in the former
case do not exist in connection with the latter.
is firmly established that,

So it

as against dubsequent assign-

ees for

a valid consideration,

trustee,

or holder of a fund,

a notice to the debtor,
is necessary in order to

perfect the assigrnnent

and render it

Qui prior est tempore,

potior est jure,

valid and effectual.
is

the well known

maxim of the 1w regarding the position of litigants in
courts of ]a w as to their respective rights in the same
This rule always contrls where,

property.
contract,

all the thing is

ing to be the subject
must decid'e.

given;

by the first

for then there

is

noth-

of the second contract and priority

But there

-ire certain conditions under

5,3

the rile is
not

not to be resorted to when the question does

lie between bare and equal equities.

of equ itable assignments

priority of time is
not be at Il

to bein

ty of tirx ,
to call

decisive,

him in

date,

of equal equities,

counteracted".
contended that
conveyance

and the

notice

wishes to rely

But

if

subsequent

than in

case

is

s to

preference,

not

(n

is

it

is

1)

"If

awa

.

is

c ntract merely,

It

with

asit

r-nd

may be
to tb

true that
he does

of the

not

consum-

is

personalLy

almost

inevitably

to attach one's right upo.n the thing itself,
be given.

be a b.;lance

done

It

the assignor

desired,

who

which priority

for from the moment

transaction

purchaser

a necessary requisite

interest.

the

of prioti-

thepurchaser

cease

have given,

of an equitable

mation of the

the

irndependent

(Dearie v. Hall, 3 Russ,

need to give notice;

bound.

at any time there appears

in

the

of date might otherwise

one

"If

title

isoutstanding;

because the equities

t(.circujnstances

a better

cases

can not be contended that

for the legal estate

precedes

if

it

equal.

respect

In all

the legal title

and of such circumstances

rmr

For exsxnple

be implied.

which this legal maxim cannot

is,

notice must

you omit to give that notice you are
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guilty of the same degree and species of neglect as he
who leaves a personal clattel to which he has acquired a
title,

in the actual possession andunder the

control of another person".
to an innocent

If the

absolute

chattel is conveyed

third person fro value, the real owner is

estppped from attempting a recovery.
regarded as equivalent,

Giving notice is

or atleast analagous to the act

of taking possession.
It should be carefully obeserved, however, that
enable a subsequent assignee to
this nmanner

,

to

obtain a priority in

by giving the first notice to

the debtor or

legal holder, he must be an assignee in good faith and
for a valuable consideration.

This is the English rule

and has been adop ted in this countrj.
In

the case of Tallman v.

Hoyt

(89 N.

Y. 537)

it

wjs

held that a valuable consideration was an essential elemnt of an equitable asignrrent
614)

(Stone v. Frost,

61 N. Y.

-

The asa gnee of a chose in action,
debt

or

notice,
which

an obligation,
in

general

takes

subsist against

it.

or a trust
it;

whether

fund althou h

subject

to all

it

be a
, ithout

the equities

In the .leading case

of Bush

55

v.

Lathrop (22

I.

Y.

535),

a mortgane was transferred by
by an instrument absolute

a subsequent as.ignee thereof,
on its

face,

but was taken in fact as security for a

m uch smaller sum than that due upon the mortgage,
the second assignee transferred it
third

for full value to a
that equi-

was held

It

person without notice.

and

ties existing between the assignor and assignees of a
chose

in action not negotiable,

ferred to a subsequent
tice.
or.

The latter

(Beebe v.

246; Covdll
Hill,

28;

assignee for value and without no-

1 Johns.

Bank,

Poillon v.

529; James v.

1 Paige,
Martin,

Van Wyck, 3 Barb. Ch. 647).

citing Bush v.

(Litchfield v.
100 U. S.
dent:

Bank,

572).

Lathrop

I Sand.

anything but
the question,

Ch.

Sargent

(supra)

f powet

Schenck,

3

569; Sweet v.

in

(104

N. Y.

with marked approval

Cowdrey v.

The reason of this rule

the beneficial

2 Cow.

Chief Justice Ruger lays

97 N. Y. 581;

The holder of a chose

Murray,

131; Muir v.

down the same rule in Fairb-nlcs v.
108),

trans-

takes the exact position of his vend-

Bank,
v.

attend the title

is

Vandenburg,
very evi-

action cannot alienate

interest he possesses.

and capacity

lo

It

is

transfer to anoth-

er and that capacity &s to be exactly measured by his own

56

rights.

(Greene

lege v.

Whetler,

%..

v.

Warwick,

er

in

must

be

only to

Brown v.

does

assignnents

no, -

I De.

F.

G.

& J.

Savage,

interests

334;

Jones v.
principle
in

the duty rests

upon all

to use reasonable

diligence

enforcing

ity

throught

his laches

negligence.

It

take

all

a

fund,

(In

ladd,

Jones,

eit+-

is

verbal

re

Tichener

it

The rule as

instrldnents

like.

but

8 Sir(,

not

to

applies
arising

(Glyn v.

Hood,

633).
of any re-

irr-espctive

to obtain priotity,

assignees
Ierfecting

of things

in

their

titles

actin
or

a subsequent rurcl-ser

who has

qeneral rule

:.teps permitted

to actual possess ion

of the

money claims

as against

and for value,
is

be given

635).

in

order

in

sho ld

An assignee may -lose prior-

rights.

their

inrgood faith

lent

4 Drew,

funds and the

to give notice

in

Union Col-

the notice

ly to negotiable

ageneral

is

qu1irement

should

if

pe,rsnal property debts,
contract,

that

notice

and certain.

of equitable

from the

It

but

defitite,

35 Beat. 317;

2 20;

or other holder

or verbally;

explicit,

to notice

seen t!-

trusyee,

writing

Y.

1.

As we biave already
to the debtor,

64 N.

1e,
1IT*. Y, 88)

been injured by

tlit

by Ia

the

the

assignee

which ?re equiva-

